Abstract In this paper we continue investigations of proof theory of default logic. It turns out that, similarly to classical logic, default theories can be represented in normal forms.
Introduction and preliminaries
In this paper we develop a representation theory for default logic of Reiter ([Rei80] ). The question is whether one can find "normal forms" for default theories, that is, if there are syntactical constraints which can be imposed on default theories without changing extensions. In this section we introduce basic definitions and recall fundamental concepts of default logic. We introduce the notion of representability of default theories in Section 2 and prove a number of results of both positive and negative nature. A weaker notion, semi-representability, is studied in Section 3. We prove that with this weaker notion we can represent every default theory by a default theory with all rules either monotonic (that is justification-free) or semi-normal ( [Eth88] ). In Section 4 we discuss another structure associated with default logic, a weak extension. We show that every finite family of finitely generated theories can be represented as a family of weak extensions of a suitably constructed default theory. A result on autoepistemic expansions is given as a corollary.
We use standard logical notation. The reader is referred to [Fit90] and [Men64] for the unexplained concepts. The presentation of default logic follows one we gave in [MT93] . . Elements of L are called justifications of r. When a rule has no justifications we call r monotonic.
2. The formula ω is called a consequent of r. The set of consequents of rules in D is denoted by CON S(D). 1. Let S ⊆ L. Let (D, W ) be a default theory. An S-derivation of a formula ϕ in (D, W ) is any finite sequence < ψ 1 , . . . , ψ n > such that ψ n = ϕ and for all i ≤ n at least one of the following holds:
A default theory is a pair (D,
(a) ψ i is a tautology or
(c) ψ i is the result of applying modus ponens to some ψ j , ψ k , j, k < i or (d) There is a rule α:β 1 ,...,βm ψ i ∈ D such that α = ψ j for some j < i and ¬β 1 , . . . , ¬β m / ∈ S.
2. Cn D S (W ) is the set of all formulas possessing an S derivation in (D, W ). is called a generating default for S if α ∈ S and ¬β 1 , . . . , ¬β m / ∈ S.
2. If S ⊆ L and (D, W ) is a default theory then S is called a weak extension of (D, W ) if S = Cn(W ∪C) where C consists of consequents of generating defaults for S.
Theorem 1.4 (Reiter) Every extension is a weak extension. In particular, if S is an extension of (D, W ) then for some C ⊆ CON S(D), S = Cn(W ∪ C.
2. If S 1 , S 2 are two different extensions of a normal theory (D, W ), then S 1 , S 2 are incompatible. That is S 1 ∪ S 2 is inconsistent. Proposition 1.9 For every formula Θ there is a formula ϕ such that ϕ is in double disjunctive form, and Θ ≡ ϕ is a tautology.
Representation of Default Theories
One way of looking at the normal form theorems in propositional logic is this. Assign to a formula the set of all its models. It is quite obvious that ϕ ≡ ψ is a tautology if and only if ϕ and ψ possess exactly the same models. Then the normal form theorems say that for every formula ϕ there exists a formula ψ in, say, disjunctive normal form with precisely the same set of models. We lift this way of looking at normal form to the present context. To this end we introduce the notion of equivalent default theories and the associated notion of representability. 
3. A class R of default theories represents default logic if every default theory is representable in R.
It is quite obvious that ≈ is an equivalence relation. This, in turn, implies that if (D, W ) is representable in R then every theory equivalent to (D, W ) is also representable in R.
AE
We first prove a negative result. Let N be a class of all normal default theories. One can ask if N represents default logic. The answer to this question is negative. We base it on Theorem 1.5 which says that not only are extensions of a normal default theory inclusion-incompatible, but they are, actually, pairwise inconsistent. The proof of Proposition 2.2 tells us that the reason for non-representability of (D, W ) in N is that two of its extensions are consistent each with the other. In a sense it is the only reason.
Definition 2.3 A theory T is finitely generated if there exists a finite set of sentences {ϕ 1 , . . . , ϕ k } such that Cn(T ) = Cn({ϕ 1 , . . . , ϕ k }).
We will now prove the following result.
Proposition 2.4 Let T α : α < γ be a collection of pairwise inconsistent, finitely generated consistent theories (γ can be finite or infinite). Then there exists a normal default theory (D, W ) such that T α : α < γ are precisely the extensions of (D, W ).
Our assumption is that for α = β, T α ∪T β is an inconsistent theory, that is {ψ α ∧ ψ β } is an inconsistent theory.
is a normal default theory. We claim that T α , α < γ, are precisely extensions of (D, W ). By Theorem 1.4 the only candidates for extensions of (D, W ) are of the form T = Cn({ψ α 0 , . . . ψ α ξ . . . : ξ < η}). But if η > 1 that is if more than one generator is selected, then such theory T is inconsistent. But then
Thus the only possible candidates for extensions are T α 's. Since ψ α , ψ β are pairwise inconsistent therefore, for α = β, ¬ψ α ∈ T β . Therefore for every α < γ, the only rule applicable with respect to T α is d α .
But then:
Cn
If all extensions of (D, W ) are finitely generated, consistent, and pairwise inconsistent, then (D, W ) is representable in N .
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One can read Proposition 2.4 and similar results as saying that once the desired images of the world are known then it is "easy" to design a default theory determining them. Of course it is precisely what does not happen. In practice the process is different; we usually have a collection of facts and rules and then look for images of reality, not conversely.
We have a simple but useful property of the relation ≈.
Proof: In both (a) and (b) we prove that for every S ⊆ L, formulas Sprovable in each of the two default theories are precisely the same. This implies that these theories have precisely same extensions.
¤
We will prove now a simple representability result. Given W ⊆ L, let D W be the following collection of rules:
That is, every ϕ ∈ W is transformed to a rule r ϕ which has no prerequisite and no justifications and has ϕ as the consequent.
↑ n(∅) denote the result of the n-fold iteration of the operator R D∪D W T on the empty set. By induction on n we prove that for all n, R 
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The practical role of Corollary 2.8 is restricted. The reason is that often we think about default rules as the part of the reasoning mechanism that does not change (or at least changes rarely), and of W as the data, that can change frequently. In this setting Proposition 2.7 says that in case of data that changes very rarely, we can build it into the reasoning system.
We prove now two technical results. They play the role of distributive laws and will be used below to prove a subtler normal form result. In Proposition 2.9 we proved distributivity of consequents with respect to conjunction. Next, we prove the distributivity of justifications with respect to alternative. 
Proof If S is closed under consequence then ¬(δ 1 ∨ δ 2 ) / ∈ S if and only if ¬δ 1 / ∈ S or ¬δ 2 / ∈ S. Indeed, ¬(δ 1 ∨ δ 2 ) is equivalent to ¬δ 1 ∧ ¬δ 2 and the equivalence follows.
Next, observe that all the rules d, d 1 , and d 2 possess the same prerequisite (premise) and the same consequent. This means that for every formula ψ an S-derivation of ψ from W using rules from D ∪ {d} is, actually an Sderivation of ψ from W using rules from D ∪ {d 1 , d 2 }. Indeed, the sequence itself does not change, only the reason why a formula is put in that sequence change! Similarly, every S-proof of ψ using rules of D ∪ {d 1 , d 2 } is an Sderivation of ψ using rules in D ∪ {d}. As in the proof of 2.9 this implies that Cn We will present now a much deeper representability result (due to Yang and others [YBB92] ). First, recall that every propositional theory T has precisely the same consequences as the theory T ′ = Cn(T ) ∩ Clause. That is, every theory is faithfully represented by a set of clauses. We show an analogous result for default logic. Next, again by Proposition 2.6 we can assume that every consequent γ of a default rule in D 1 is in a conjunctive normal form. Then the repeated application of Proposition 2.9 produces a theory ( W ) ) and the consequents of rules in D 2 are clauses. In this fashion both the conditions (a) and (c) are enforced.
To make sure that the condition (b) is satisfied we use Proposition 1.9 and Proposition 2.6. Thus each β i can be assumed to be in double disjunctive normal form, that is θ j where each θ j is a negated clause. Now we apply repeatedly Proposition 2.10. In this fashion we get a set D ′ of clausal rules such that (D ′ , W ) ≈ (D, W ). 
Theorem 2.12 yields a theory that consists of simpler objects (clausal default rules), but may be much larger than the original theory (D, W ). In a sense the situation is similar to one we get when we represent a theory T ⊆ L by the set of clauses. But here we have an additional step: after all formulas α, β j , γ are put in disjunctive normal form, the theory D ′ is obtained in the process of splitting conclusions and justifications that once again increases the size considerably.
Another fact worth mentioning is that the transformation described in Theorem 2.12 does not preserve normality. That is, if (D, W ) is a normal default theory, and D ′ is computed as above, then (D ′ , W ) usually will not be normal.
Semi-representability of default theories
We will prove now another representability result. This time, however, the language in which we will construct suitable default theories will be an extension of the language L by means of new constants. 
We turn our attention to semi-normal rules. The concept of a seminormal rule is a natural generalization of a normal default rule. The idea is that the process of derivation here is weaker than in the case of normal default theories. Instead of deriving ψ ∧ γ out of ϕ and consistency of ψ ∧ γ, one cautiously derives only γ. This mode of reasoning does not, in general, guarantee the existence of extensions. } where p,q, r are distinct atoms. Then (D, W ) is a semi-normal default theory without extensions.
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A weakly semi-normal theory is very closed to semi-normal. Besides of cautious derivations, as described above, we allow derivation steps which employ rules that do not require justifications at all. These rules, in the provability paradigm we use are applicable with respect to any context.
We will prove now a result on semi-representability of default theories. e r = c r 1 ∧ . . . ∧ c r kr : γ When r has no justifications then e r = r and there are no rules d r,i at all. Now, define R r = {d r,1 , . . . , d r,kr , e r }, and finally:
Clearly (D ′ , W ) is a weakly seminormal theory. We will prove that:
(1) Every extension of (D, W ) extends to an extension of (D ′ , W ).
(2) For every extension T ′ of (D ′ , W ), the theory T ′ ∩ L is an extension of (D, W ).
These three facts together clearly imply our theorem. We prove now (1). First we make the following simple observation:
Claim 3.3 Let T ⊆ L be consistent theory, and let {c 1 , . . . , c s } be a set of new atoms. Then T + = T ∪{c 1 , . . . c s } is consistent. Moreover Cn(T + )∩L = Cn(T ).
Proof of claim: Every valuation V of L can be extended to a valuation V ′ of At∪{c 1 , . . . , c s } making c 1 , . . . , c s true. Since V ′ and V coincide on At, they coincide on all the formulas of L as well. Therefore, if T is consistent, so is T ′ . Also, every formula of L unprovable from T is still unprovable from T ′ . Thus the second part of the claim is valid. The rule e r is justification-free and is always in D T ′ . It follows that unless all the formulas β i are consistent with T , the rule e r is not applicable. This implies that if T is an extension of (D, W ) then for T ′ as defined above, all the constants from the set r∈D T C r can be T ′ -proved and so, for every rule r ∈ D T , its consequent γ is proved using D T ′ as well. This implies that T ′ coincides with the closure of W under the rules from D T ′ and so T ′ is an extension of (D ′ , W ).
Next, we prove (2). Let T ′ be an extension of (D ′ , W ). Consider the collection of rules actually used in the reconstruction of T ′ . These rules are of three types: Either its consequent is a new constant (when the rule is of the form d r,i , or it is a justification-free rule
γ with γ ∈ L, or, finally, it is of the form
It is now clear that γ ∈ L is the consequent of an applicable default rule (with respect to T ′ ) if and only if α ∈ T ′ ∩ L or if c r 1 , . . . , c r k all belong to T ′ . But this last case happens precisely when β r 1 , . . . , β r k are all consistent with respect to T ′ . But β r 1 , . . . , β r kr all belong to L. Therefore β r 1 , . . . , β r kr are consistent with respect to T if and only if they are consistent with respect to T ′ ∩ L. This implies that all the consequents of these applicable defaults that are in L, are provable from W using rules of D with T ′ ∩ L as a context. It is also clear that no other consequent is provable. Therefore T ′ ∩ L is an extension of (D, W ).
Finally, we prove (3). If T is an extension of (D, W ) and T ′ is an extension of (D ′ , W ) and T ⊆ T ′ then T ⊆ T ′ ∩ L, and by (2) T ′ ∩ L is an extension of (D, W ). Therefore T = T ′ ∩ L since different extensions of (D, W ) cannot be included one in the other (Theorem 1.5). Consequently, if T 1 , T 2 are two extensions of (D ′ , W ), and T is an extension of (D, W ), and T ⊆ T 1 , T ⊆ T 2 then T 1 ∩ L = T = T 2 ∩ L. Now let us look at the form of the rules in D ′ . Those of these rules which are used to derive new constants have as a justification a (single) formula of L. Therefore its consistency with T i depends only on T i ∩ L. But for both i = 1, 2 this intersections T 1 ∩ L and T 2 ∩ L coincide. Therefore T 1 and T 2 contain precisely the same new atoms. Since T i is generated by T i ∩ L and a collection of new atoms, T 1 and T 2 must be identical.
¤ 4 Representation for weak extensions
Finally, we prove a representability result for weak extensions. We will show that every finite set of finitely generated theories is precisely the collection of weak extensions of a suitably chosen default theory.
Theorem 4.1 Let T 1 , . . . , T k be a finite set of theories in L, each T j finitely generated. Then there exists a finite default theory (D, W ) such that T 1 , . . . , T k are precisely the weak extensions of (D, W ).
Proof: We can assume that T i = Cn({ϕ i }). Define a preordering in the set {ϕ i : i ≤ k} as follows:
Clearly: ϕ i ≺ ϕ j ≡ T i ⊆ T j . Define a default theory as follows: put W = ∅, and to define D first define Z i = {ϕ j : ¬(ϕ j ≺ ϕ i )}. Thus ϕ j ∈ Z i if and only if ⊢ ϕ i ⊃ ϕ i . Define ¬Z = {¬ψ : ψ ∈ Z}. Now we are ready to define our set of default rules D. When ϕ i is minimal in the ordering ≺, set
and for ϕ i that is not minimal define:
Then set D = {d i : 1 ≤ i ≤ k}. Clearly, (D, W ) is a finite default theory. Firstly, we claim that every T i is a weak extension of (D, W ). Indeed, it is easy to see that d i is the only applicable rule with respect to T i . Notice that d i is the only applicable rule and the consequent of d i is ϕ i and T i = Cn({ϕ i }).
Therefore T i is a weak extension -because it is generated by W and the conclusion of (the only) generating rule. Next, we prove that T i 's are the only weak extensions of (D, W ). So let T be a weak extension of (D, W ). Then T is generated by W and the consequents of applicable default rules. Let d be such rule. . Then all the formulas ϕ j , j = i do not belong to T . But ϕ i ∈ T . Since T is generated by some of formulas ϕ n , T = Cn({ϕ i }). . Here all the formulas ϕ j such that ⊢ ϕ i ⊃ ϕ j do not belong to T , but ϕ i ∈ T . As above T = Cn({ϕ i }).
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It is perhaps worth mentioning that for minimal ϕ i i, T i is also an extension of (D, W ).
Corollary 4.2 Let T 1 , . . . T k be a finite set of stable theories in the language L L such that for every i ≤ k, the theory S i = T i ∩ L is finitely generated. Then there is a finite theory I ⊆ L L such that T i are precisely autoepistemic expansions of I.
